DU CONTRAT SOCIAL The most important, at least the most systematic, of Rousseau's works on political science is the Contrat Social. Rousseau had as early as 1743, during his stay at the French embassy in Venice, become interested in political questions. In the following decade, exactly when it is impossible to say, he had planned and begun to write his Institutions politiques which he never completed. It seems from the statement in the Confessions (Partie II, Livre IX) that he had done considerable work upon it by 1756. Later, in 1759, he decided to extract from the unfinished larger work the section which he revised and published as the Contrat Social. It appeared in April, 1762, in an edition published by Rey, at Amsterdam. Although the last chapter on La Réligion Civile was written in 1757, the main body of the work was composed, at least in a first draft, considerably earlier, most probably about 1754, and dates, therefore, from about the time of his writing the Discours sur l'Inégalité. Much has been written on the contradictions between these two works, especially the difference in attitude toward the state of nature which in the Contrat is dismissed briefly.1 1 Students interested in this question and that of the date of composition should consult the discussion between A. Schinz and G. Beaulavon in the Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France (1912-1913), also Dreyfus-Brisac, Du Contrat Social, Paris, 1896; Beaulavon Du Contrat Social, Paris, 2o édition, 1914; Vaughan, Political Writings of Rousseau, London, 1915. The two latter contain excellent bibliographies. Some of this confusion will be obviated if it is remembered that Rousseau's purpose and intention in the two works were quite different; the Discours was critical and destructive, the Contrat idealistic and constructive. The idea that the state was based upon a contract was not original with Rousseau. Indeed it was a commonplace of political discussion and could be found in one form or another in Hobbes, Locke, and Jurieu, to mention but a few with whom Rousseau was familiar. What distinguishes Rousseau's contract is the fact that it is made not between the people and a "prince" or ruler, but between the people and themselves, each individual agreeing to surrender his rights to the state, in the government of which he is in return to possess an equal right with his fellows. When later political historians assert that historically there never was any such contract, they are merely saying what Rousseau would himself have admitted. His point is that in order that a state should have the moral right to govern its citizens it must be based upon "the consent of the governed." When these same critics, as occasionally happens, employ the above phrase, they are themselves asserting that democratic government exists only where there is at least an implied agreement between the governing body and the governed. How far Rousseau is right as to the terms of this implied contract is however quite a different question and one where he is certainly open to serious criticism. The heart of Rousseau's political theory may be said to be found, however, in his conception of the "volonté générale," and it is his most important single contribution to political theory. Locke had made the distinction between "public will" and "private will" (On Civil Government, Chapter XIII). The conception of Rousseau is, however, far more clearly developed and becomes central to his system. The doctrine of the volonté générale is first stated by Rousseau in his article on Économie Politique published in Vol. V. of Diderot's Encyclopédie (1755). He there refers to an article by Diderot himself in the same volume on Droit Naturel. Whether the conception originated with Diderot or with Rousseau and what each owed to the other is uncertain. There can be no question, however, that the development of the idea and its later prominence are due to Jean-Jacques. According to him it is with the creation of this general will that the state comes to have a corporate existence of its own. This will expresses itself in the spirit and patriotism of the citizens and in the laws of the state. In a state properly constituted citizens actuated by the general will are capable, according to Rousseau, of acting against their selfish interest as private citizens, and the general will is, therefore, not the same as the will of all, considered as private individuals. This idea has been attacked severely by many political historians as chimerical and mystical. Mystical it may be, chimerical it certainly is not. Rousseau had been profoundly impressed by Plutarch's heroes who sacrificed themselves to their city or state, and it was the city states of antiquity as much as the Republic of Geneva that he had before himself as his ideal. When today we speak of a good citizen as one actuated by "public spirit," we are very near Rousseau's conception of the volonté générale. It is true that Rousseau seems to contradict himself when he demands of citizens that they surrender to the state virtually every one of those individual rights which, on other occasions, he so eloquently extolls. It is also true that through his consequent failure to safeguard adequately the rights of individuals, a minority would be completely at the mercy of the majority, and his system could be made, as it was in the French Revolution, an excuse or pretext for the worst forms of mob tyranny.3 SUJET DE CE PREMIER LIVRE L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers. Tel se croit le maître des autres qui ne laisse pas d'être plus esclave qu'eux. Comment ce changement s'est-il fait? Je l'ignore. Qu'est-ce qui peut le rendre légi5 time? Je crois pouvoir résoudre cette question. Si je ne considérais que la force et l'effet qui en dérive, je dirais: Tant qu'un peuple est contraint d'obéir et qu'il obéit, il fait bien; sitôt qu'il peut secouer le joug et qu'il le secoue, il fait encore mieux; car, en recou10 vrant sa liberté par le même droit qui la lui a ravie, 2 It should be remembered that Rousseau had in mind, in writing the Contrat, a small compact city state, and that he never expected the Contrat, as it stood, to be used as a constitution. When he was planning constitutions for Corsica and Poland, he himself proceeded quite differently. 3 On this whole question see Vaughan, Political Writings of Rousseau, Vol. I, pp. 422-428. ou il est fondé à la reprendre, ou l'on ne l'était pas à la lui ôter. Mais l'ordre social est un droit sacré qui sert de base à tous les autres. Cependant ce droit ne vient point de la nature; il est donc fondé sur des conventions. Il s'agit de savoir quelles sont ces conventions. Avant d'en venir là, je dois établir ce que je viens d'avancer. -Livre I, Chap. I. DU DROIT DU PLUS FORT 5 Le plus fort n'est jamais assez fort pour être toujours le maître, s'il ne transforme sa force en droit et 10 l'obéissance en devoir. De là le droit du plus fort, droit pris ironiquement en apparence et réellement établi en principe.* Mais ne nous expliquera-t-on jamais ce mot? La force est une puissance physique; je ne vois point quelle moralité peut résulter de ses effets. Céder 15 à la force est un acte de nécessité, non de volonté; c'est tout au plus un acte de prudence. En quel sens pourra-ce être un devoir? Supposons un moment ce prétendu droit. Je dis qu'il n'en résulte qu'un galimatias inexplicable; car 20 sitôt que c'est la force qui fait le droit, l'effet change avec la cause; toute force qui surmonte la première succède à son droit. Sitôt qu'on peut désobéir impunément, on le peut légitimement; et puisque le plus fort a toujours raison, il ne s'agit que de faire en sorte 25 qu'on soit le plus fort. Or, qu'est-ce qu'un droit qui périt quand la force cesse? S'il faut obéir par force, on n'a pas besoin d'obéir par devoir; et si l'on n'est 4 Rousseau is here criticizing Hobbes's theory. |