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"M. Condorcet's Esquisse d'un tableau historique des " progres de l'esprit humain, was written, it is said, under "the pressure of that cruel proscription which termi"nated in his death. If he had no hopes of its being " seen during his life, and of its interesting France in " his favour, it is a singular instance of the attachment " of a man to principles, which every day's experience

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was, so fatally for himself, contradicting. To see the " human mind, in one of the most enlightened na"tions of the world, debased by such a fermentation " of disgusting passions, of fear, cruelty, malice,

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revenge, ambition, madness, and folly, as would "have disgraced the most savage nations in the most "barbarous age, must have been such a tremendous " shock to his ideas of the necessary and inevitable

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progress of the human mind, that nothing but the "the firmest conviction of the truth of his prin"ciples, in spite of all appearances, could have "withstood."

Mr. Malthus in his pick-thank way, here takes occasion to sneer at Condorcet for his attachment to principles, which, he asserts, every day's experience was contradicting. As this of mine is not a pickthank work, I must take the liberty of observing, as I have never read M. Condorcet's work, that if his ideas of the future progress of the human mind were the same as those of other writers on the subject, that debasement of character, and that mass of disgusting passions, which developed themselves in the events to which Mr. Malthus here alludes, were the strongest confirmation of the necessity of getting rid of those institutions which had thus degraded the human character, and under which such passions had been fostered: for to say that the progress of the human mind, in spite of those institutions, was necessary and inevitable, or that there were no such passions as fear, cruelty, malice, revenge, &c. belonging to the character generated by the old system in France (in which an immediate change could not be expected without a miracle) would have been such a contradiction to common sense, and to all their own favourite schemes of reform, as no madman in the height of revolutionary madness was ever guilty of. All that could ever be pretended by the advocates of reform was that there were capacities for improvement in the mind, which had hitherto notwithstanding the advantages of knowledge been thwarted by human institutions. The contradiction rests therefore not with Condorcet, but with our author. The same objection has been often made, and often refuted. But there are some reasoners who care little how often a fallacy has been exposed, if they know there are people who are still inclined to listen to it.

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"This posthumous publication is only a sketch of

a much larger work which he proposed should be " executed. It necessarily wants, therefore, that " detail and application, which can alone prove the "truth of any theory." [This remark I cannot admit. I do not think for instance that any detail or application is necessary to prove the truth of Mr. Malthus's general principle of the disproportion between the power of increase in population, and in

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the productions of the earth, or to shew the bad consequences of an unrestricted increase of population.] A few observations will be sufficient to "shew how completely this theory is contradicted, "when it is applied to the real and not to an imaginary " state of things." [The contre-sens implied in this expression is not a slip of the pen, but a fixed principle in Mr. Malthus's mind. He has a very satisfactory method of answering all theories relating to any imaginary alterations or improvements in the condition of mankind, by shewing what would be the consequences of a certain state of society, if no such state of society really existed, but if every thing remained just as it is at present. He thinks it sound sense and true philosophy to judge of a theory which is confessedly imaginary or has never been realized by comparing it " with the real and not with an imaginary state of "things." That is, he does not adopt the necessarian maxim that men will be always the same while the circumstances continue, but he insists upon it that they will be always the same, whether the circumstances are the same or not. Some instances have already appeared of this in the foregoing work. The following passage may serve as another instance. After supposing Mr. Godwin's system of equality to be realized to its utmost extent, and the most perfect form of society established, he exclaims, " this would " indeed be a happy state; but that it is merely an

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imaginary state with scarcely a feature near the "truth, the reader, I am afraid, is already too well "convinced." Mr. Godwin himself was I apprehend very well convinced that this imaginary state was very different from the truth or from the present state of things, when he wrote his book to shew how much better the one would be than the other is. He then goes on, "Man cannot live in the midst of plenty. "All cannot share alike the bounties of nature. "Were there no established administration of pro

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perty, every man would be obliged to guard with "force his little store. Selfishness would be trium"phant. The subjects of contention would be per"petual," &c. If there were no established administration of property, while men continued as selfish as they are at present, (which is I suppose what Mr. Malthus means by applying the theory to the real state of things) the consequences here mentioned would no doubt follow. But it is supposed that there is no established administration of property, because the necessity for it has ceased or because selfishness is not triumphant, but vanquished. This is the supposition. Mr. Malthus however persists, that were there no established administration of property, "every man " would be obliged to guard with force his little store "since selfishness would still be as triumphantas ever." This is contrary to all the received rules of reasoning. He then proceeds to examine, how long Mr. Godwin's theory if once realized might be expeeted to last, and how soon the present vices of men would discompose this perfect form of society, concluding very wisely that " a theory that will not admit of ap" plication cannot possibly be just." True: if a man tells you that a triangle has certain properties, he is bound to make good this theory with respect to a triangle, but not with respect to a circle. The outcry which Mr. Malthus here makes about experience is without any meaning. It is evident that we cannot make this word a rule in all cases whatever. For instance, if a man who is in the habit of drinking a bottle of brandy every day of his life and consequently enjoys but an indifferent state of health, is advised by his physician to leave off this practice, and told that on this condition he may recover his health and appetite, it would not be considered as a proof of any great wisdom in the man, if he were to answer this reasoning of his physician by applying it to the real, and not to an imaginary state of things, or by saying, "The consequences you promise me from submitting to your regimen are indeed very desirable; but I cannot expect any such consequences from it: I have always been in very bad health from the habit I have constantly been in of drinking brandy; and it would be contrary to the experience of my whole life to suppose, that I should receive any benefit from leaving it off." In like manner, I conceive that it is not from any great depth of philosophy, but from the strength of his attachment to the good things of this life, that Mr. Malthus makes so many ill-judged appeals to experience. He is afraid of launching into the empty regions of abstraction, he stands shivering on the brink; or if he ventures a little way, soon turns back again, frightened out of his wits, and muttering something about population. His imagination cannot sustain for a moment the idea of any real improvement or elevation in the human character, but instantly drops down into the filth of vice and misery, out of which

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